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An investigation is made of the Navy Exploratory Develop-
ment Program; its newly revamped management system, its
organization and underlying rationale. The investigation
then addresses the processes of program selection, review and
evaluation as applied to technology base programs, followed
by an overview of a methodology called "Evaluation Research"
as it applies to goal oriented programs. The paper is dir-
ected toward determining the effectiveness of technology base
programs, with a major emphasis on the changing structure of






A. THE TECHNOLOGY BASE 11
B. THE EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM,
THE CRITICAL LINK 15
III. EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 19
A. RATIONALE FOR A POLICY PLATFORM 19
1. The EDP as a Public Program 20
2. EDP Rationale 22
3. Policy Formulation 23
4. An Assessment 24
5. Concluding Comments 27
B. STRUCTURE OF THE EDP
(A CHRONICLE) 29
C. A CHANGING CONTEMPORARY PROGRAM 33
1. Direction by Technical Strategy 3 5
2. Negotiating the Program 37
3. Allocation of Funds 39
4. Review and Evaluation 4 2
5. Operation — Correlation of Elements
and Strategies 43
IV. PROGRAM SELECTION AND EVALUATION IN NAVY
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT 46
A. BACKGROUND 4 6
B. HISTORICAL APPROACHES 48
C. MODERN APPROACHES 52
D. IN RETROSPECT 57

V. DETERMINING ROI IN THE EXPLORATORY
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 61
A. EVALUATION RESEARCH FOR THE EDP 62
B. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION RESEARCH 65
C. ELEMENTS OF AN EVALUATION RESEARCH
PROCESS 67
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 70
APPENDIX A Exploratory Development Program
Responsibilities 75
APPENDIX B Exploratory Development Program
Documentation 90




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 115

LIST OF TABLES
I. Exploratory Development Functional Areas, 1962 30
II. Research and Development Categories as Percent
of Total RDT&E,N Appropriation FY 62-FY 73 49
III. Features of Common R&D Planning Models 51
IV. Summary Description of Methods for Allocating
Development Resources 54
V. Block Diagram Decision Matrix 64

LIST OF FIGURES
1. R&D Program Planning and Justification Process,
Early 1960*s 31
2. OST Structure 38
3. "Chain of Accountability" 40
4. Exploratory Development Program Process
Flowchart 41
5. Relationship Between Program Elements, Technical
Strategies/Substrategies , and STOs 44
6. Conceptual Outline of a Long Range Research
and Development Planning Process 59

I. INTRODUCTION
There has never been a period in history in which the
determination of the worth of programs within the Department
of Defense (DoD) structural framework has been so critically
viewed. Adding to this observation is the discernible fact
that relative budgets within the Research and Development
(R&D) Program are steadily decreasing.
This concern encompasses total system acquisition, oper-
ations and maintenance, hardware and software development,
concept feasibility, pure research and all other programs
intermediate. Further, the concern is broad-based to the
extent that it has become a prime distress not only to the
government sector of DoD, but also to the supporting indus-
trial counterparts.
Owing to the desire then to better justify on-going pro-
grams, to promote innovation and concentration on highest
leverage opportunities, to expedite the transfer of technolgy
and projects to advanced development (category 6.3) and use
of new technical capabilities developed in research (category
6.1) and to demonstrate relevance and cost effectiveness,
the Research and Development program in total is currently
undergoing a modification of the existing management planning
system, particularly the Exploratory Development Program (EDP)
The objective of this paper then is really twofold:
(1) to investigate the changing structure, organization and
underlying rationale of the Exploratory Development Program

in the Navy and (2) to investigate the processes of program
selection, review and evaluation as applied to technology
programs within the EDP. Included will be a brief on the
development of the EDP, a treatise on why it is a necessary
and contributing element of R&D and also a discussion of what
the future might hold for determining the "worth" of technol-
ogy type programs
.
Because of the significance placed on an understanding
of the operations of the EDP as a necessary and crucial pre-
requisite to developing a meaningful evaluation methodology,
the majority of this paper is focused on identifying the
foundations and workings of the newly revamped Exploratory
Development Program. This understanding is essential before
any succinct attempt can be made to alleviate the discrepan-
cies in the review and evaluation techniques, existing today.
Hopefully, a closer interpretation of the EDP will facilitate
a more viable methodology for determining the Return-on-Invest-




A. THE TECHNOLOGY BASE
Somewhere between basic Naval research on one end of the
Research and Development (R&D) spectrum and full scale devel-
opment on the other, fall a great many projects which come
under the heading of applied technology, or technology base
programs. The technology base is the total reservoir of
organized knowledge from directly and indirectly sponsored
basic research into physical and social phenomena and the
feasibility of new processes, techniques and components for
using them (Ref . 1) . Its end result is new organized knowl-
edge. The base also retains fallout information and contri-
butions left over from exploration and development of specific
systems. The creation and exploration of candidate systems,
in turn, is shaped by the information available from the tech-
nology base.
One of the largest and perhaps most dynamic businesses in
the United States today is that dealing with the acquisition
of major weapon systems for the Department of Defense. Due to
the size and complexity of the federal government and its
associated agencies, management of the affairs of this organi-
zation requires a tremendous amount of activity and coordination
This business entity, not unlike any other, maintains a
growth posture made possible by both internal and external
influences. These influences are visible through the technol-
ogy development programs supported by the organization. Thus,
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a most important faction of the R&D community within the
Department of Defense (DoD) is that responsible for developing
and maintaining a strong technology base.
The technology base is supported by both Government and
private activities. Private groups (such as industrial com-
panies) and nonprofit organizations (such as Federal contract
research centers and universities) both contribute to the
technology base and recommend technology base programs, just
as do the federal laboratories and other supporting agencies.
Within DoD, the defense laboratories are charged with main-
taining the technology base by sponsoring activities in support
of potential systems. Laboratory research objectives are
planned to generate better technological tools five to twenty
years in the future. There does indeed exist a requirement
for the technology to be related to mission/operational needs.
Due to the seemingly nebulous nature of these technology
oriented programs, a great deal of scrutiny has been, and con-
tinues to be, given them, with primary emphasis of the concern
aimed at their resultant value. Because of the presence of
intangible outputs in the sense of quantification, coupled
with an evidence of decreasing relative budgets, technology
administrators at all levels within the command have been, and
continue to be, faced with the dilemma of determining which
programs should receive their attention. Their problem is
essentially twofold: (1) How are they to determine which of
the many proposed (alternative) programs should be selected




It is very difficult to know how much should be spent for
technology base activities because payoffs are virtually
unpredictable and only rarely are they realized at some future
date in a directly traceable manner (Ref . 1) . Operational
needs can be met most effectively at the lowest possible cost
by innovative products built on new technology being created
for its own sake (pure technology) as well as that which
remains as fallout from other system efforts (applied
technology)
.
A significant problem in defense has been to control the
relationship between technology base activities and system
acquisition programs. Technology base projects have gone on
to develop more than just the raw elements and material to
meet as yet unexpressed needs. Traditionally they have devel-
oped subsystems and system concepts independently of specific
needs. Once developed, subsystems have sought out homes in
new system candidates and systems in turn have searched for a
need they could satisfy. Further, these subsystems have been
old technologies extended to improve the performance of old
kinds of products.
There is a common misconception that defense systems have
suffered because they have embodied too much "new technology"
and, as a result, have become too complex, sophisticated and
expensive (Ref. 1) . The explanation for this is that what is
"new" about "new technology" is the higher level of perform-
ance demanded from the old technical approaches. In fact,
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subjective ratings have indicated that systems, while becoming
more complicated and expensive, have become less technologi-
cally advanced.
Applying new technology to meet more stringent needs can,
in fact, result in simpler, less costly systems. As a common
example, the transistor development has markedly reduced the
cost and size of electronic systems and improved their reli-
ability, maintainability and other cost of ownership factors.
The need for an active and viable technology base is thus
extremely important. The larger the span of technical and
scientific activity sponsored by the Government, the more
extensive will be the optional technological choices avail-
able to the system designer. It is imperative that cost-
benefits be maximized in providing the technology base for
new systems. This then can only be realized when the base
program is driven from operational needs and mission require-
ments. This, in turn, requires a most judicial and expedient
methodology for determining the criteria for the selection
and evaluation and the effectiveness of the technology base
programs in the R&D environment.
Just as critical as a well defined and operable methodology
for determining selection and evaluation criteria, is the
understanding of the actual program, or system, which is to
be operated on. No attempt could ever be made to determine a
program's worth, or return on investment (ROD, without a prior
and thorough understanding of the functions and underlying
philosophies of that program. It is crucial that a sound
14

foundation be established from which goals and strategies
can be derived rather than the traditional dollar value of
output.
B. THE EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AS THE CRITICAL LINK
While many definitions of exploratory development exist,
there are several functions that should be fulfilled by this
category of Research and Development. These might be grouped
into the following areas;
1. The translation and application of research results
to practical use, including the formulation of new
technology areas.
2. Feasibility demonstrations of component and system
hardware concepts.
3. Applications of new technology to existing components
or systems.
The nature of the preceding functions implies that both the
inputs and outputs of exploratory development are quite
varied, and can be thought of as a continuum. Maximum benefit
in an Exploratory Development organization would appear to
accrue from having the continuum functions in close proximity.
The purpose of the Exploratory Development program as
delineated by NAVMATINST 3910. 7B of 3 October 19 74 is as
follows
:
The purpose of the Exploratory Development program
is to develop the technological wherewithall to solve
specific Navy and Marine Corps problems, and to identify
and exploit new technological opportunities which may
stimulate new operational concepts within the operating
forces. It is the policy of the Chief of Naval Develop-
ment that the program include concept formulation effort
15

in the form of analytical and experimental effort to
help identify problems, determine alternative solu-
tions thereto in terms of prospective systems, sub-
subsystems and techniques, and demonstrate the technical
feasibility of those solutions to a degree which
warrants their consideration for support under Advanced
Development. Selectively, where a system or subsystem
is relatively small and of low technical risk, the
program may support effort aimed at acquiring informa-
tion prerequisite to commencement of Engineering
Development. Such effort, however, should stop short
of engineering refinements characteristic of proto-
typing development for procurement, inventory or opera-
tional deployment. While the program may also encompass
analytical and experimental work on the technologies
directly related to materials, components, processes,
techniques, and individual equipments of Navy and
Marine Corps interest, broad-based investigations in
physical, biological, environmental, medical, behavioral,
social and engineering sciences characteristics of the
Naval Research program are not permitted. Effort of
an exploratory nature, which has a primary purpose of
direct support of specific Advanced, Engineering or
Operational Systems Development projects should be
funded and accomplished as an integral part of those
projects, subject to close coordination with related
effort in the Exploratory Development program.
The operation of this system has several characteristics
that are significant in the management of applied technology
Ccategory 6.2) programs (Ref. 2).
• Very broad technological base requiring judgements and
technical expertise in many fields at all levels of control.
• Many layers of control—DDR&E, ASN (R&D), CND, SYSCOMs,
Offices, DLP, DNT, laboratories—and necessity for coordina-
tion of tasks with related programs as well as with pure
research (category 6.1) and advanced development (category
6.3) .
• Coordination necessary between services and with the
industrial complex.
• Results of program efforts are seldom visible or recog-
nized in the system that reaches operational use.
• Categorization of tasks is not easily relatable to naval
responsibilities, missions, operational concepts, or systems.
16

• CNO's guidance on Naval needs is not directly trans-
latable into R&D requirements. CNM does not interpret oper-
ational needs for SYSCOMs. Each SYSCOM (and suborganization
within SYSCOM) employs a different subjective means in
defining R&D goals. There is no priority assigned to indi-
vidual tasks.
• The system creates a large number of low level funded
tasks (approximately 650 Task Area Plans (TAPs) (DD1634)
yearly)
.
• Approved TAPs can be underfunded or not funded at the
discretion of SYSCOMs or laboratories without reference to
CND or DNT.
• Reductions in funding are frequently made by propor-
tionate cuts which results in perpetuation of sub-critical
programs and reduced effort on critical programs.
• Excessive effort is devoted to making minor changes in
funding levels with resulting turbulence.
• Inordinate effort is devoted to management, funding
changes and justifications of programs which takes technical
personnel away from productive tasks.
• The system fosters "micro-management." Program reviews
frequently do not result in "make-a-dif ference" changes.
• Protection of in-house effort emphasized as contrasted
to contractor effort.
• Delay in exploiting available technology.
• Overemphasis on evolutionary and fix-it projects.
• Inadequate scientific and technical advice in special-
ized fields involving programs of several organizations.
• Critical problems exist related to coupling the 6.1,
6.2, and 6.3 programs to initiate an Engineering Development
(6.4) program.
It thus becomes evident that a crucial prerequisite to
any understanding of the methodologies of Exploratory Develop-
ment program selection and evaluation is a thorough under-
standing of the program itself. For this reason, and owing
to the fact that EDP is at this time undergoing major organi-
zational and structural revision, a significant amount of
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attention is shown this subject in this thesis. The EDP is
indeed the "critical link" in terms of developing major weapon
systems within the Department of Defense, and understanding
the functions and operations of it are also critical in terms
of measuring program worth. The changes in the program have
been initiated in an effort to alleviate the negative aspects
of the previously mentioned characteristics of the program
operation. It is felt that only through an understanding of
the function/operational aspects of the EDP can the concept
of Return-on-Investment be addressed, since this must ulti-
mately be linked to the organizations' goals and strategies
rather than dollar value of output.
18

III. EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
A. A RATIONALE FOR A POLICY PLATFORM
Because of the tremendous size and complexity of the
Federal Government and its many associated agencies, manage-
ment of the affairs of this organization constitutes a very
significant amount of activity and coordination. Accordingly,
a great deal of scrutiny is given the policy platforms and
expenditure characteristics within sub-organizations of this
complex.
This section will investigate the Exploratory Development
Program within the Department of the Navy, examine the policy
of the EDP and the rationale behind that policy, examine
several influences which are evidenced by the technology pro-
gram, and provide a personal critique of that policy plat-
form currently existing for the EDP from the standpoint of a
public procurement.
It is felt that a comfortable understanding of the EDP
policy is a valuable and key element which allows a better
comprehension of the significance of the EDP structural
change, thus leading toward a discussion of the present pro-
gram organization and characteristics. The approach then
will be to first address the broader issue of external policy
influences and then focus on particular program policies as
delineated by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research




1. The EDP as a Public Program
If any government program could be labeled "public/ 1
the Exploratory Development Program must certainly be con-
sidered as a leading contender. The business of this program
is certainly conducted for the general welfare of the people
of the United States through the guise of building and main-
taining a strong and viable defense posture. Clearly then,
the output of this entity is to be labeled a public good,
since it is consumed by all members of the community of the
United States. The control of expenditures is governed by
the internal processes within the Department of Defense (DoD)
,
since the costs of production cannot be maintained by competi-
tive pricing.
Because of the nature of the product in the Explora-
tory Development Program, the citizens do not actively par-
take in setting policy or in providing an oversight function.
This task is left to entrusted officials within DoD, as well
as the mix of activities performed. The financing aspect of
the EDP comes under close scrutiny through the auspices of
both Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
in the Executive Branch of government. Programs on-going
must continually be justified and reviewed for content, return,
applicability and need.
There is a facet of the EDP which presents itself as
an externality to the private sector. This is the area which
is embodied by the notion of "technology transfer." This
term is used to imply that technology, as the output from a
20

research effort, can be utilized productively in many loca-
tions and organizations over and beyond its initial specific
mission (Ref . 3) . The process of technology transfer in the
EDP has traditionally been one of primarily outflux from DoD.
The working policy and structural framework of the
EDP is built to closely resemble a standard "rational model"
organization (Ref. 4) . This will become quite evident later
when the working policy/critique is presented. However,
implementation of this policy is probably more closely repre-
sentative of the classical "bureaucratic model," with only
a moderate trend toward a politically contrived system (Ref.
5) .
It should be submitted that no "Operational Code"
exists which might be any more distinctive than the academic
models just mentioned. This hypothesis is supported by
noticing the well defined organizational concepts and general
propositions under which the EDP functions; high degree of
standardized procedures, uncertainty avoidance, centralized
policy formulation, decisions made by leaders, presence of
parochial priorities, actions are organizationalized, change
is definitely incremental, long range planning is prevalent,
goals and tradeoffs are of primary concern, decisions are
based on administrative feasibility, change is directed from
higher authority and there is limited flexibility in the line
functions of the organization. Additionally, one can very
obviously witness well defined rules of the game, actions
which come about as a result of political inducements, definite
21

separation and identification of chiefs and indians and much
mis-communication, all of which point toward a strong influ-
ence of the political model characteristics (Ref. 4)
.
Having provided an overview of the structure of the
EDP and its operational characteristics and public attributes,
attention now will focus more closely on the particular policy
of the program on which its platform is built. Any discus-
sion of the Congressional and Presidential influences on
the EDP has been negated because it is not felt to be a pro-
gram, primarily because of its size and technical complexity,
which lends itself to the normal control imposed by those
forces. All interactions which do exist are enacted at the
ASN (R&D) level, the results of which follow.
2. EDP Rationale
A review of the Navy's Exploratory Development Pro-
gram by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R&D) led to the
recent concern to re-establish the policies which are intended
to govern that section of Research and Development. As a
result, the ASN (R&D) has specified the policies, performance
objectives, and responsibilities concerned with the overall
management of the Department of the Navy Exploratory Develop-
ment Program (Ref. 6).
It is the belief of the ASN (R&D) that improvements
are possible in technical strategy, responsiveness to innova-
tion, transferring results into useful applications, visi-
bility to management, and demonstration of the rationale and
cost effectiveness of the Exploratory Development Program and
22

its elements. The underlying rationale of the Exploratory
Development Program is derived from the fact that this
activity, like all others, must compete for its resources.
This implies that the programs be continually justified in
meaningful and convincing terms
.
According to the ASN (R&D) , to assure that the long
term benefits are clear, Exploratory Development must demon-
strate how it (Ref . 6)
:
a. Provides technical opportunities which stimulate
the development of substantially improved and/
or totally new operational capabilities.
b. Provides solutions to problems arising in the
developmental process.
c. Provides opportunities to regain operational
superiority or to exploit and enhance an
existing operational superiority.
d. Provides for the transformation of new research
discoveries into useful applications, and for
the innovative extension of existing technologies
to significantly more advanced applications.
3. Policy Formulation
Using as a foundation the principles implicit in the
current operation of the Program, policies have been identi-
fied which are intended: to enhance the productivity of
Exploratory Development; and to improve the ability to demon-
strate the need for, and benefits resulting from, the pro-
gram's activities (Ref. 6).
a. The Exploratory Development Program shall be
based on a set of dynamic technical strategies
designed to:
(1) take maximum advantage of new technical
opportunities




(3) provide prompt response to perceived
requirements for superior naval capability.
b. The Exploratory Development Program shall be
made visible through an information system per-
mitting technical, as well as financial audit
on a current basis to cognizant levels of
management. The principal intent of the inform-
ation system is to permit control of the tech-
nical strategy at higher levels, facilitate
execution of the programs at the most techni-
cally competent levels, and facilitate the
transfer of technology to advanced development.
c. The Exploratory Development Program shall include,
to the maximum extent practicable, 'block
programs' which are identified with major tech-
nical strategies and under the management of an
organization whose mission/product line or
technical competence is most appropriate.
d. The Exploratory Development Program plan shall
be consistent with overall assigned ratios of
in-house to contract work for balanced utiliza-
tion of the national technological base.
e. The Exploratory Development Program and its
elements shall be based on a more explicit




The Exploratory Development Program shall be
based on cost-effective principles and shall
consider, as well as budgetary implications,
the potential costs of acquisition and ownership.
g. The Exploratory Development Program shall be
based on providing adequate funding for effective
exploitation of highest-leverage opportunities.
When over-all resources are inadequate or
reduced, funds required for support of such
projects shall be made available through can-
cellation or curtailment of projects with lower
promise of military worth within the framework
of technical strategy.
4 . An Assessment
In general, the rationale and the policies identified
are not inconsistent with the overall policies of Fiscal and
Life Cycles of Defense Systems. That is to say, the basic
24

questions of need, technical feasibility and funding avail-
ability are inherent in the policy information for the
Exploratory Development Program. However, an immediate con-
cern which comes to mind is whether the policies, being
quite broad and abstract by their very nature, can be sup-
ported and/or even interpreted at the working levels. This
concern is not peculiar to this particular policy formula-
tion, rather it deals with the structure of policy enactment
through any large organization.
Because the policies have already been identified,
the approach that will be taken now will be to address each
policy statement separately and provide personal comment as
deemed appropriate.
Policy A: Primarily the emphasis should be placed
on the term technical strategy, as a means of assuring that
the programs supported are productive, needed and will pro-
vide benefit. It would appear that a sophisticated and
well-managed communication (information flow) scheme is
necessary to carry out the desires of top management. Worth
questioning is the productivity, however, of focusing atten-
tion on the deficiencies of the opposition to the detriment
of encouraging an offensive approach. Further, to provide
for 'prompt response' would necessarily imply that the cor-
porate memory and developmental capability of the in-house
sector be maintained.
Policy B: Almost without exception would there be
an agreement with the notion of a needed buildup of a more
meaningful information system. It is always potentially
25

possible though that a problem of unidirectional information
flow will ultimately come into being. There also appears to
be some conflict with the idea of maintaining control at the
higher levels, and at the same time encouraging decentraliza-
tion of the EDP . Decentralization is essential in order to
promote and produce technical excellence and thus realize
maximum productivity.
Policy C: There currently exists much support of the
notion of 'block programming 1 on the basis of less duplica-
tion of efforts, greater knowledge of state-of-the-art in the
particular product lines, and increased ability to select and
evaluate the individual programs within the EDP.
Policy D: Clearly the bottom line here is to bolster
and maintain a strong technology base, whether that be pro-
vided for by industry or in-house. An obvious question which
surfaces given a predetermined ratio, is just where in the
organization that ratio must be measured— for this will have
a definite influence on accountability within the system. It
should be realized that the ultimate decision should be one
which yields the maximum advantage to the government's carry-
ing out its mission. This philosophy necessarily requires a
consensus that those goals and missions have properly and
adequately been delineated.
Policy E: While the notion of return-on-investment
appears relatively straightforward at first glance, its appli-
cation in an area such as Exploratory Development is extremely
difficult to enact. This is due to the obvious lack of
26

tangible, and thus quantifiable, output from the individual
programs. However, in the context of wanting to maximize
the benefits of the dollars invested, the concept is crucially
appropriate.
Policy F: As much as is possible, attention should
be given to the potential downstream costs of acquisition
and ownership. It is this basis which will ultimately provide
for a rational decision as to which programs will be supported
in future Exploratory Development programs.
Policy G: Certainly the philosophy most often
followed in practice would lead one to select those alterna-
tives yielding the greatest leverage. Seriously questionable,
however, is that portion of this policy that suggests each
program be evaluated on its own merits and would be subject
to cancellation if it showed less favor in terms of military
work. It is of general belief (supporting that belief exis-
ting at the NAVMAT level) that in most cases, existing pro-
grams will continue to be funded unless there is obvious
reason to alter that decision on the basis of either lessened
or increased need.
5 . Concluding Comments
There is a general trend in the Navy's Research and
Development Program, including the Exploratory Development
Program, to shift back to an originally supported organiza-
tional structure of being decentralized. This is due to a
large extent to the desire to promote accountability at all
levels of the R&D organization. Additionally, it is observed
27

that trends definitely indicate future total budgets to rise,
while the percentage allocation to the Exploratory Develop-
ment category will, as has been experienced in the past
decade, definitely decline. As a result of this observation,
it is noted that technology development is definitely not
independent of weapon system development.
It is noteworthy in summary to exploit the under-
lying principles evidenced in the policy formulation for the
Exploratory Development Program:
• Supportive of technological advances of funda-
mental importance to operational needs.
• Quest for technical and managerial excellence at
all levels
.
• Recognition of the necessity for both top-down
direction and bottom-up inputs
.
• Accountability essential at all executive levels.
• Necessity for strategies as tools to implement
policies.
• Recognition that sometimes technical advance must
be injected into the mainstream of the system
forcibly.
• Recognition of essential need for adequate
information systems to allow interaction.
While it is a rather straightforward task to outline
a rational approach, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to encounter a purely rational organization in
operation. Influences, personalities, and constraints are
entirely too numerous to allow anything other than some form
of an "individualized" organization to exist today, whether





An investigation of the EDP policy does, however,
serves to provide the foundation on which its organization
must be structured. Further, this foundation (rationale
and policy) provides the impetus behind the current EDP mod-
ification, which is the subject matter of the following
section of this thesis. It is important that the reader be
aware that in addition to gaining a better understanding of
the "real" system in operation today, the material presented
will hopefully provide a context in which to review the sub-
jects of program selection and evaluation in applied tech-
nology in a more meaningful manner.
B. STRUCTURE OF EDP (A CHRONICLE )
The creation of the offices of the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E) , Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Research and Development) , and Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Development) (DCNO(D)) back in 1959 set the stage
for some revolutionary changes in the way R&D programs, and
hence Exploratory Development programs, would be planned,
justified and implemented for the next two decades. The
concept of a complete R&D spectrum with basic research on the
one end and full scale development on the other was inherent
in the procedures of the first decade.
Technology programs were established which covered a wide
variety of efforts, ranging from pure research in components
and subsystems to fairly sophisticated experimental hardware.
These technology programs at that time were characterized as
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being comprised of projects more closely focused on end-
products than research but entailing a higher level of uncer-
tainty and lower financial commitment than full scale
development.
Bureaus and offices were established in areas relevant to
their assigned responsibilities. Project listings were
required to be structured according to the format of Table I
(Ref . 7) . So for the first time, senior staffs in the Depart-
ment of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
had a viable framework for scrutinizing the exploratory devel-
opment effort and the funds allocated to it.
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The process of planning and justifying programs in the
early 1960s is broadly depicted in Figure 1 (Ref. 7) . There












































employ a "carte blanche" attitude to initiate new programs
in response to general requirements. This philosophy began
to erode, however, with the enactment of PPBS , and eventually
the organization became extremely controlled, and hence, cen-
tralized by the end of the first decade.
In 19 70, DDR&E then introduced two new types of documents
which more clearly stressed the concern of program worth,
justification and relationship to mission areas. They were
called Technology Coordinating Papers and Area Coordinating
Papers. They were intended to highlight program gaps, over-
laps, and need for improved coordination among the Services
(Ref . 8)
.
And so, during the early baseline period, technology pro-
grams represented a segment of the Navy's R&D program in
which the management operated with little or no outside inter-
ference. Guided only by the most general requirements, bureau
personnel relied heavily on Fleet and laboratory personnel,
discussions with the Fleet and experience of their own offi-
cers and engineers to identify problems, initiate programs
and evaluate their on-going projects.
There was a trend toward greater emphasis and dependence
on the Navy laboratories, i.e., block programming. The bureau/
SYSCOM point of view initially was to oppose block programming
on the grounds that it amounted to delegating authority to
the laboratories without commensurate accountability for ful-
filling SYSCOM responsibilities. The idea of block programming
has since become a reality, and is now in full effect, with
nearly full support, in the Navy organization.
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Block programming, as interpreted today, is a means for
providing technical management in the laboratories and Systems
Commands with the necessary authority (including control of
funds) to plan and manage technical effort related to the
pursuit of significant objectives. As will be seen later,
block programming is a significant influence in the current
planning and justification process proposed for the Explora-
tory Development Program.
C. A CHANGING CONTEMPORARY PROGRAM
The Navy Exploratory Development Program is just nearly
completing a transition from a system, which has been in
operation for a number of years and is relatively well known
by the Navy R&D community, to a new system. Central to these
modifications is the use of dynamic "technical strategies,"
designed to focus exploratory development more directly and
visibly on Department of the Navy operational needs. The
first implementation of the program utilizing these technical
strategies will commence during the current fiscal year.
This program reorganization is a result of the CND/DCNM(D)
having been directed by the ASN (R&D) to establish and imple-
ment a program to improve the exploratory development system,
to improve higher echelons' understanding of the system and
to justify 6.2 expenditures.
As indicated previously, under the former 6.2 management
system the program consisted of a large number of low level
funded tasks which were negotiated primarily between staff
personnel of the SYSCOMs and the laboratories without
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direction of either top level management or the best qualified
technical personnel who are generally located at the labora-
tories. The relationship between funded tasks and operational
needs was not altogether visible and the contributions that
new technologies could make to increase effectiveness or
decrease costs were not apparent. As a result, justification
of the program to Congress, OSD and to ASN (R&D) was not con-
vincing. There was a lack of funding focus on high payoff
innovation and on feasibility demonstration of critical end
item products. Further, there had been an inadequate inter-
action of 6.1 with 6.2 and coupling with 6.3 and a lack of
coordination with related work by other services and industry.
The objectives of the modified 6.2 management system were
then identified to (Ref . 9) :
• Provide top-down direction by the use of technical
strategies, prioritized technical objectives and
definition of major program thrusts designed to meet
operational requirements.
• Provide visibility by relating the program to Navy
functions and to operational needs
.
• Promote innovation and concentration on highest
leverage opportunities.
• Expedite transfer of projects to advanced development
(6.3) and use of new technical capabilities developed
in research (6.1).
• Demonstrate relevance and cost effectiveness.
These objectives were to be achieved by clear definition
of organizational responsibilities, development and execution
of programs to achieve approved technical objectives, allo-
cation of blocks of funds to organizations and delegation of
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authority to implement programs to meet assigned responsibili-
ties. CND is the designated responsible entity to ASN (R&D)
for operation of the system. Appendix A is included to delin-
eate the EDP management responsibilities, including design
principles and roles of the various organizations in the 6.2
Program.
There are four basic elements of the new 6.2 planning sys-
tem which utilize the technical strategy concept.
1. Direction by Technical Strategy
Designated strategists identify, define and analyze
mission needs and on-going or potential technical efforts
related to satisfying those needs. Mission needs are derived
from analyses of threat, preferred operational concepts and
system and subsystem concepts. Current programs and work
by industry and other services are major factors in assessing
technical potential. Technical objectives are derived from
mission needs and potential technology. The strategies then
are used to define the desired major thrust in prioritizing
the technical objectives.
These dynamic technical strategies are designed to
take maximum advantage of new technological capabilities,
exploit deficiencies in opposition capabilities and provide
prompt response to perceived requirements for superior naval
capabilities (Ref 6). Basically, strategic planning is not
a new idea, and it implies "... the process of determining
the major objectives of an organization, and the policies and
strategies that will govern the acquisition, use and disposi-




The enactment of an Exploratory Development program
policy based on the idea of technology strategies is a signif-
icant breakthrough in terms of developing a more meaningful
rationale for program/project evaluation. The primary reason
for this is that heretofore, organizations had neglected to
recognize that there had been a definite lack of clarity in
just what they were trying to measure. This belief is sup-
ported by various studies of productivity measurement and pro-
gram evaluations (Ref . 11) .
It should be recognized that Exploratory Development,
like every other activity, must compete for its resources.
Although the necessity for an extensive program is obvious to
those within the RDT&E establishment, to assure maintenance
at the desired level, the program must continually be justi-
fied in meaningful and convincing terms. To assure that long
term benefits are clear, Exploratory Development thus must
demonstrate how it:
a. provides opportunities which stimulate the
development of improved or totally new
operational capabilities,
b. provides solutions to problems arising in
the development process,
c. provides opportunities to regain operational
superiority or enhance existing superiority,
d. provides for the transformation of new research
discoveries into useful applications, and the
extension of existing technologies into signifi-
cantly more advanced applications.
To accomplish this, then, the system being assembled
at the NAVMAT 03 level addresses not only objectives, strate-
gies and tactics (OST) , but also interrelates them and
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describes how the system works to harness research and devel-
opment for the achievement of definite organizational goals
(Ref . 12)
.
Essentially the OST system is based on three major
ideas: (1) formulation of an OST plan consisting of a hier-
archal arrangement of corporate objectives, technical strate-
gies, and developmental tactics, (2) the super position of
this organization over the normal operating organization,
and (3) the use of line managers in the operating organiza-
tion as action officers. Figure 2 presents this system in a
somewhat simplified manner.
This current model thus contains all the elements of
the historical and modern approaches, e.g., cost, timeliness,
risk, weapon systems, value measures, etc., and also provides
the additional and quite significant notion that the goals
and policies of the organization need be accounted for.
The strategies then, as developed for the Navy EDP,
will indicate allocations recommended for additional objectives
with justification. DNT will provide guidance regarding over-
all concepts for functional areas, and also to strategists
through the inclusion of relevant material from program objec-
tive memorandums
.
2 . Negotiating the Program
With the implementation of the new policy, all explor-
atory development programs will now be prenegotiated between
SYSCOMs, laboratories and DNT prior to beginning each fiscal
year. After the programs have been developed they then are










There are three types (categories) of programs, the
characteristics of which determine how the organization will
manage them. Cat I is broadbased, multi-use technology. It
is negotiated between DNT and laboratory CO/TDs and funded
and managed by the laboratories. All "special topic" strategy
areas are included in Cat I programs. Cat II is concept-
related effort for which the SYSCOMs are customers. It is
concerned primarily with exploratory development of systems
and subsystems concepts for accomplishing mission needs.
Projects for this kind of work are negotiated between the
using SYSCOMs and the cognizant laboratories. Once negotiated
and approved by DNT, it is funded directly as a block to the
performing laboratory which manages it. Cat III work is per-
formed primarily by industry or other contractors. It in-
volves primarily work related to transition of concepts to
advanced development, and it is managed directly by the SYS-
COMs. Figure 3 shows the "chain of accountability" which now
exists in the EDP and the types (categories) or programs for
which the various tiers are responsible. The planning pro-
cess which has been formulated in consert with the new manage-
ment system is depicted in Figure 4.
3 . Allocation of Funds
Of the total funds allocated for the EDP, the Chief
of Naval Development withholds a total of 15 percent of each
program element to take care of subsequent Congressional cuts,
to provide for new starts, for developing the strategies, for
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projects. The bulk of the funds (roughly $2.75B yearly)
are allocated to SYSCOMs and laboratories. Once the con-
tracts for work have been negotiated, changes can be made
only by the SYSCOMs for the CAT III programs and TD of labor-
atories for CAT I and II programs. Final approval, as before,
always rests with the Director of Navy Technology.
4 . Review and Evaluation
The review and evaluation focuses on two major
issues: (a) were the resources actually utilized as covered
in the approved program as amended and (b) to what degree
were the technical objectives developed by the strategies
accomplished. It was perceived by management that the basic
review and evaluation questions should focus on contributions
to future Navy operations and cost ef fectivensss . At the
time of research gathering for this paper there were no de-
tails available as to how the review would be conducted but
the objective is clear—substantive evaluation from the view-
point of Congress, DDR&E and ASN (R&D) and not micromanagement
It is anticipated by EDP management that program administra-
tors, strategists, and a qualified panel of independent
individuals with knowledge of Navy needs, and other Federal
and industrial efforts would be involved in review and evalu-
ation process. However, it should be noted again that no
clear and definitized methodology yet exists to conduct a
complete program selection, review and evaluation program
(Ref . 9) .
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5. Operation—Correlation of Elements and Strategies
In development of the strategies, the program element
titles, which had been originally listed by the CND, were
expanded to the current total of 37 (Ref . 9) . Although this
increase facilitated submission by the cognizant internal
agency, its effect is to fracture the program and make more
difficult their aggregation in an overall plan. Figure 5
shows the relationship which now exists between program ele-
ments (PEs) , technical strategy areas and the Science and
Technology Objectives (STOs) . It is noted that there is a
high degree of correlation between PEs and strategies except
in sea control and power projection where the strike warfare,
countermeasures and two other program elements are split be-
tween sea control and projection.
The Chief of Naval Development establishes and promul-
gates the structural framework for planning, programming and
budgeting the EDP (Appendix B) . This structure provides the
link with DoD Program elements, defines the scope of work
within specific areas, and identifies the organization within
the Navy responsible for the planning, programming and
budgeting. Appendix C is included to provide clarification of
the fundation of the Exploratory Development program by delin-
eating its new structural framework.
The system described above is new this current fiscal
year. It is quite naturally going to involve a great deal of
"negotiating" between the staffs of NAVMAT , laboratories and
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that a firm understanding of the technical strategies, func-
tional areas and program elements be had to augment an under-
standing of the EDP objectives and transition steps. Only
through a thorough knowledge of the inner-workings of the new
system will any meaningful review, evaluation and assessment
methodology be realized. As indicated, no established pro-
gram or technique currently exists, but there certainly is
potential for developing a viable methodology, particularly





IV. PROGRAM SELECTION AND EVALUATION IN NAVY
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT
With a background presented of the Navy Exploratory-
Development program , its functions, its responsibilities and
its policies for implementation, it is beneficial to investi-
gate now the manner in which programs have traditionally been
reviewed, selected and evaluated. It would serve the reader
well to keep in mind the new EDP characteristics, particularly
while going through this review. This will provide a deeper
comprehension of why the methodologies to be discussed were
considered viable, as well as why they eventually were evi-
denced as not being able to adequately predict, as a manage-
ment tool, as originally intended.
A. BACKGROUND
Technology base programs constitute a large number of
projects in the systems acquisition process, falling some-
where between pure research on one end of the R&D spectrum
and full scale development on the other. In the early years
of the Navy R&D sector, these technology programs operated
with little or no outside interference to the performing
organization. Ideas for solving Fleet related problems and
exploiting technological opportunities were converted into
exploratory development projects with relative ease (Ref . 7)
.
In these early stages of R&D project plans, task assign-
ments and monitoring procedures were generally flexible and
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tailored to the needs of the individual managers at all
levels. This process was in keeping with the "cradle to
grave" concept.
More recently, a perceived need to provide guidance for
technology programs was reflected in documents ranging from
top level Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic planning documents
to OPNAV's General Operational Requirements and CND Explora-
tory Development Goals. But this guidance soon tended to
be either too general, providing little guidance at all, or
so specific that it inhibited exploration of relevant
alternatives.
Because the problems associated with this guidance and
direction quite naturally are felt at all levels within the
organizational structure, the problem of effective program
selection and evaluation has thus remained a significant
issue, particularly in the area of exploratory development.
According to a recent House Armed Services Committee
report, concern was expressed that "... just spending money
on research and development does not guarantee a sound R&D
program or good military hardware" (Ref . 13) . The committee
further indicated that the Department of Defense could
improve its efforts and its management through better tailored
programs which would:
• Select out weapons not cost effective
• Avoid unnecessary duplication of effort
• Place greater emphasis on product improvement
• Provide more meaningful management review processes.
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It is not surprising that a tremendous amount of attention
is currently being given to the valuation of DoD programs
in Research and Development in general and Exploratory Devel-
opment in particular.
Adding now to the complexity of this situation is the fact
that throughout the past fifteen years, while the total budget
for RDT&E,N appropriations has been steadily increasing, the
relative percentages allocated to the technology base pro-
grams (6.2 category) have been steadily decreasing. This
situation is depicted in the bar chart representation of
apportionments, shown as Table II.
And so, just within the past decade, many scientific, and
some not so scientific, approaches have been tried for poten-
tial application to technology base program evaluation and
determination of return-on-investment figures. Most of these
scientific techniques have been tried more at the lower
echelons of the Navy R&D organization, although few have seen
any real application or effectiveness. The approach currently
in vogue at the NAVMAT 03 level is built around the concept
of "technology strategies." There appears to be merit in
pursuing this technique, at least for a selected application.
B. HISTORICAL APPROACHES
One of the early comprehensive attempts to sort, categorize
and evaluate R&D selection and program evaluation techniques
was that done by Baker and Pound back in the mid-sixties (Ref.
14) . This article points out that most were oriented toward




Research and Development Categories as
Percent of Total RDT&E,N Appropriation FY62-FY73
FISCAL- YEAR PROGRAM
Note: These amounts are derived from the past year columns of the various Congressional
Budget Submissions and are not precisely consistent with New Obligational Authorizations.
The difference results from reprogramming between program years, permitted in "no-year"
appropriations. The data for each fiscal year's program is the latest category distribution
developed for budget presentation and best reflects actual relative dollar size of the various
categories for each fiscal year. FY 1962 was the firs^year in which this category classifica-
tion scheme was systematically applied.
Source: Thomas Leckey,
24 December 1974.
Assistant Comptroller for Budget and Reports ONR, In letter of
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provide a sound base for presenting the early methods thought
to have potential. It is interesting to note that a review
of the majority of the documents reviewed in this account
covering this early era indicated that very few of the tech-
niques presented actually ever saw any relevant usage.
Keeping in consonance with the early organization and
management of the exploratory development sector of R&D, pro-
ject selection thus remained a relatively unstructured prob-
lem. For the most part, the early methods just did not
provide an adequate description of the R&D process. At this
point, it might appear feasible to question not only the pre-
dictive models but the process which the models were attemp-
ting to simulate. While it was recognized that program
selection was a sequential decLsion making process, practi-
cality would certainly indicate that detailed criticism of
these early models would be unwarranted.
One important observation made, according to Baker, was
that "...there has not been a satisfactory definition of the
objectives against which a research program should be evalu-
ated." The significance of this statement, while having
clarity at this point, will take on new interpretations later
in this section. Another key issue raised in these early
studies, although it received little more attention than having
been mentioned, was the idea that the "strategic need" some-
how ought to fit into the organizational and market structure.
The methods applied in the early stages of investigation
consisted almost entirely of three major methods: decision
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theory, economic analysis and operations research. Table III
is included in an attempt to summarize the significant features
of these methodologies.
Table III
Features of Common R&D Planning Models
Feature Method







4. Relationships between criteria No
5. Relationships between projects No
6. Optimal allocation to project
7. Budget constraint
8. Skill & facility constraints




















A prime observation of these methods and practices is that
there exists a strong and definite need for testing to demon-
strate feasibility of the predictive models. Without adequate
demonstration, even the "best" descriptive models prove sus-




Once the idea that the management process of project
selection and evaluation was realized to have potential as
being predictable from a management scientist approach, a
profuse amount of literature emerged, quite naturally. A
great many new ideas were postulated, some unique in their
own right, although most were merely extensions of what had
already been presented in the early years.
An excellent study conducted by IDA provides an informa-
tive synopsis of the modern techniques being employed (Ref
.
15). Although prepared in early 1972, the methods discussed
are still being utilized, if only under slight improvement.
Because the modern techniques have tended to align them-
selves in the more strict, quantitative approach to program
selection and evaluation, most of the discussion at this
point will tend to follow along with that momentum. With the
ensuing budget constraints, as previously mentioned, the
patter associated with the modern approaches will necessarily
allude to resource allocation as its primary objective.
Realize, however, that the real issue is still the process of
determining which programs are to be selected for support and
how, then, can they be evaluated once initiated.
Some problems are inherently embedded in the modern
methodologies, owing to their strong alliance to the quanti-
tative approach of evaluation. A strong underlying problem
is that even with modern conveniences and sophisticated ana-
lytical software and hardware, the utilization factor still
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remains low (Ref 16) . According to Albala in his work on
stage approaches to R&D projects:
This condition can be partly ascribed to the fact
that (a) most of the proposed methods involve models
requiring much quantitative input, not readily avail-
able within the company, and (b) in many instances
the methods are based on techniques much too elaborate
for the R&D manager's routine use.
In subtle opposition to this belief is the posture taken
by Trozzo of IDA (Ref. 15.) Accordingly, Trozzo feels that:
Development of more quantitative methods for allo-
cating resources within Exploratory Development should
continue, however, oecause their rigorous structure
should provide (1) a useful frame of reference for
organizing information and regular liaison among system
specialists, technologists, and research managers, and
(2) a systematic procedure for searching out a develop-
ment program that will best fulfill Defense goals.
Albeit, included as Table IV a summary description of the
methods used for allocating resources, taken directly from
the study by IDA. Its inclusion is useful in showing the
definite trend to quantitative rationale and also to demon-
strate that each organization utilizes a methodology unique to
its particular operation, based to a large extent on its own
needs and variables.
Thus the techniques that have grown to occupy currently
acceptable standards have adhered to the general conclusions
of the earlier studies. To wit, there is a general recognition
that each particular stage of R&D requires a set of inputs and
constraints unique to its decision making process (Ref. 16).
Another important observation of modern approaches is their
recognition that models need be commensurate with the quality
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a large degree, is directly correlated with the magnitude of
the resources committed, which certainly should not come as
any surprise.
D. IN RETROSPECT
And so some general conclusions and statements can be
gleaned from a review of these predictive models. Firstly,
the worth-assessment process has not really been adequately
structured by the models for the specific goals and purposes
of the military R&D system, particularly the EDP . To a
large extent, this has been due to a generation of philoso-
phies which restrict the options for dealing with future
world situations by proposing concepts that are extensions of
the current force structure and generally use the current
technological approach to accomplish mission tasks. Conse-
quently, and as previously indicated, R&D activities tend to
focus on meeting system requirements rather than on gener-
ating innovative ways to accomplish mission tasks. All too
often the R&D activities in the EDP which are evaluated are
not independent, as is necessary for worth-assessment proce-
dures, but are often interrelated activities. Consequently,
the projects selected usually do not provide all the technol-
ogies necessary to develop and deploy a desired system.
Secondly, the models exercised did not adequately provide
procedures to assure the inputs necessary to meet the
assumptions and requirements of weighting criteria. That is
to say, missions, goals, and operational requirements were not




Additionally, different worth criteria and underlying
assessment processes are required to assess different activi-
ties. Each model must therefore be specifically tailored to
a particular activity. Then too, the cost effectiveness of
actually using the models is very difficult to evaluate. The
true effectiveness should generally be subjectively evaluated
in terms of how useful an R&D manager finds the results.
The future of R&D planning models similar to those identi-
fied thus far is not particularly promising in light of the
observed methodological problems and managerial resistance to
their use. The models just cannot, or have not been able to
capture all the relevant and subtle aspects of the R&D and EDP
planning process. The methodological problems preclude the
use of such models even as decision information systems to aid
managers, since their output is highly questionable.
But organizations performing Exploratory Development within
R&D must still select and evaluate among many possible activi-
ties, however. These decisions can be improved by a better
understanding of both the process of innovation and the Explor-
atory Development planning process. It is important that
organizations have systematic procedures and logical organi-
zational structures to assure that the major planning tasks are
effectively accomplished. Figure 6 has been suggested as a
representative outline of the necessary elements of a contempo-
rary planning process (Ref . 17) . To develop such procedures
and structures, the organization must clearly define what it
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within R&D. No technique , model or methodology is likely




V. DETERMINING ROT IN THE EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
It is difficult to argue with the fundamental proposition
that any large enterprise ought to seek evidence of the effec-
tiveness of existing programs and proposed program alterna-
tives as a basic guide to decision making. Yet few sound
evaluation schemes and even fewer rigorous field experiments
have actually been undertaken. Serious questions exist con-
cerning the capacity of the government both to develop and
use evaluative results. Much of the concern deals with the
short supply of competent policy-oriented researchers both
within and outside of the government, the inadequacy of avail-
able methods and concepts for carrying out evaluative studies,
and the shortage of organizations with the capacity to under-
take large-scale evaluative activities.
An evaluation method based on the tools of social research
has been applied successfully to social action programs to
determine program effectiveness. The basic principles of this
methodology, while developed originally for social and educa-
tion programs, actually are oriented toward any action program
which can attest to a sound platform of goals and objectives.
Thus, there appears to be a potentially viable technique
which would be applicable to programs exhibiting outputs which
present themselves in a somewhat unquantifiable manner.
This section presents an overview of the methodology,
called Evaluation Research (ER) , and attempts to show how it
might be applied to programs within the Exploratory Development
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Program. While a complete treatise and development of an
evaluation study on an exploratory program is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is felt that the ER technique could
be applied in particular applications to yield realistic
measures of effectiveness of technology programs. A presen-
tation of the background for the basic elements of such a
study follows
.
A. EVALUATION RESEARCH FOR THE EDP
Evaluation is a rather elastic word but common usage
would generally imply the notion of judging merit. Evalua-
tion has frequently had explicitly political overtones. It
is designed to yield conclusions about the worth of programs
and, in so doing, is intended to affect the allocation of
resources
.
A form of evaluation, called Evaluation Research, has
been devised and used in the past on social programs, although
in its strictest sense is concerned with finding out how well
action programs work. It represents the application of social
science research methods to discover information of importance
to program practice and public policy. The tools of research
are applied to make the judging process more accurate and
objective. The evaluation thus establishes clear and specific
criteria for success.
The research process is particularly important when (1)
the outcomes to be evaluated are complex, hard to observe,
made up of many elements reacting in diverse ways; (2) the
decisions that will follow are important and expensive; and
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(3) evidence is needed to convince other people about the
validity of the conclusions (Ref . 18) . Clearly then, this
scheme appears to have commonality with the R&D process in
general and the Exploratory Development Program in particular
The rationale of Evaluation Research is that it provides
evidence on which to base decisions about maintaining,
insituationalizing and expanding successful programs and
modifying or abandoning unsuccessful ones. For example, the
methodology of determining program selection at a laboratory
Block Program Office utilizes a decision matrix, as shown in
Table V, provides much of the necessary basic information
for initiating an evaluation research technique. The matrix
is utilized as a tool for determining which programs should
be supported and continued, as they relate to mission needs.
Used in this context, evaluation research is increasingly
important as a source of knowledge and direction. It can be
used to tell which programs work and which do not, and points
the way to better formulation of policy and program. It can
be even more helpful as it proceeds to identify the effects
of specific strategies and components within programs and
separates out those that contribute to favorable outcomes
from those that are ineffective or counter productive (Ref.
18). .
If evaluation and cost-benefit analysis are to have any
effect on decisions, there has to be some way to move from
the data to the decision—some system for transmitting
information and feeding it into the decision process. The
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Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) recently in
use in DoD is such a system, but it starts with the definition
of objectives rather than the delineation of goals. Providing
a systematic approach to governmental planning, the distinctive
characteristics of PPBS are:
1. It identifies and defines fundamental objectives and
considers all activities in terms of those objectives.
2. It explicitly and systematically identifies alterna-
tive ways of carrying out the objectives.
3. It estimates the total cost implications of each
alternative, looking not only at the current year but also
future years
.
4. It estimates the expected benefits of each alternative.
5. It presents the resulting cost and benefit comparisons
for each alternative, along with identification of major
assumptions and uncertainties.
PPBS is more concerned with future options than with past
experience, especially when applied in the technology program
area. But in estimating expected benefits, it has to derive
its figures from somewhere, and this is where evaluation
should come in.
B. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION RESEARCH
Evaluation research is viewed by many as a way to increase
the rationality of decision making and policy making. With
objective information on the outcomes of programs, wise
decisions can be made on budget allocations and program
planning. Programs that yield good results will be expanded;
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those that make poor showings will be abandoned or drasti-
cally modified.
An evaluation study does not generally come up with final
and unequivocal findings about the worth of a program. Its
results often show small, ambiguous changes, minor effects,
outcomes influenced by the specific events of the place and
the moment. It may require continued study over time and
across projects to speak with confidence about success and
failure
.
For decision makers, evaluation evidence of outcome is
only one input out of many. They must consider a host of
other factors, from public receptivity to participant reac-
tion, costs, availability of staff and facilities, and
possible alternatives. Evaluation will definitely not take
politics out of the decision making process.
The purpose of evaluation research is to measure the
effects of a program against the goals it set out to accom-
plish as a means of contributing to subsequent decision
making about the program and improving future programming
(Ref . 19) . The measurement of the effects refers to util-
izing a research methodology to investigate outcomes of the
program rather than efficiency or adherence to standards.
The comparison of effects with goals stresses the use of
explicit criteria for judging how well the program is doing.
Evaluation research is committed to the principle of
utility. If it is not going to have any effect on the
decision, then it is clearly an exercise in futility. Weiss
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(Ref. 19) suggests that there are probably four kinds of
circumstances in which evaluation is probably not worth doing:
1. When there are no questions about the program. It
goes on, and decisions about its future either do
not come up or have already been made.
2. When the program has no clear orientation. Program
staff improvise activities from day to day, based
on little thought and less principle, and the pro-
gram shifts and changes, wanders around and seeks
direction.
3. When people who should know cannot agree on what the
program is trying to achieve. If there are vast
discrepancies in perceived goals, evaluation has no
ground to stand on.
4. When there is not enough money or staff sufficiently
qualified to conduct the evaluation. Evaluation is
a demanding business, requiring time, money,
imagination, tenacity and skill.
The all-purpose evaluation is a myth. But there are several
types of uses for evaluation. Evaluation can investigate the
extent of program success so that decisions such as these can
be made:
1. To continue or discontinue the program.
2. To improve its practices or procedures.
3. To add or drop specific program strategies and
techniques
.
4. To institute similar program elsewhere.
5. To allocate resources among competing programs.
6. To accept or reject a program approach or theory.
C. ELEMENTS OF AN EVALUATION RESEARCH PROCESS
In abstract, the basic elements of the evaluation research
process include (1) finding out the program's goals, (2) trans-
lating the goals into measurable indicators of goal achievement,
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(3) collecting data on the indicators of the participating
elements (and for an equivalent control group), and (4)
comparing the data on participants (and control elements)
with the goal criteria.
But this process in theory becomes much more complex in
practice. A host of unexpected problems invariably arise
such as:
1. Program goals are often hazy, ambiguous, hard to pin
down.
2. Programs not only move toward official goals, but they
also accomplish other things, sometimes in addition and some-
times instead.
3. The program is a congeries of activities, people and
structures, some irrevelant.
4. The evaluation question as posed ignores the issue of
why the program succeeds or fails.
Ideally then Weiss (Ref. 18) suggests the folowing as
the necessary core issues to comprise the effective evaluation
research process:
1. Formulate the program goals that the evaluation will
use as criteria.
2. Choose among multiple goals.





5. Specify what the program is.
6. Measure program inputs and intervening processes.
7. Collect and compare necessary data.
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In its rudimentary form then, the evaluation process
encompasses the interpretation and implementation, including
the elements of policy, goals, theory, models, experiment
(to check theory and provide criteria for success-failure)
.
The experimental model remains the ideal in evaluation
methodology, with random assignment of subjects to an experi-
mental group which is exposed to the program stimulus and to
a control group which is not, thus providing the research
rationale.
It collects before and after measures over a full cycle
of the program and uses specified goal criteria. Its results,
then, disclose the extent to which a consistent program has
reached its stated goals. However, it rarely distinguishes
why the observed results occur, what processes intervene
between input and outcome or what the particular implications
are for improving the effectiveness of the program.
The application to the EDP, however, might just provide
the necessary means with which to conduct a satisfactory
selection/evaluation process, ultimately yielding a rational
method for determining program worth. The stage is set; what
remains now is a progressive-oriented faction of the Explora-
tory Development Programs , willing to commit the necessary
resources of time, personnel and money to explore the poten-
tial of this new technique.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Navy Exploratory Development Program is currently
undergoing major revision to align its management planning
system with the philosophies of the new wave of thinking
regarding program effectiveness; i.e., to meet the Navy's
basic obligation to put government resources to their most
effective use in mission accomplishment.
Traditionally, technology has gone on to develop subsystems
and systems concepts independently of specific mission needs.
Further, rather than actively building a strong technology
base through innovation, old technologies have been extended
to improve performance of old kinds of products. New systems,
while becoming more complex and expensive have actually become
less technologically advanced.
It is recognized that it is imperative that cost-benefits
be maximized on technology base programs. This, though, can
only be realized when the base programs are driven from oper-
ational needs and mission requirements.
A complete and sound understanding of the functions and
underlying philosophies and policies of the technology pro-
gram is essential to determine that program's worth, or
return-on- inves tment
.
Sound foundations must be established from which goals and
strategies can be derived to provide meaningful inputs for
evaluation methodologies of contemporary exploitation, rather
than basing output measures on dollar values.
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In terms of the policy platform for the Exploratory Devel-
opment Program, the underlying principles evidenced in the
new rationale include:
• Supportive of technological advances being of funda-
mental importance to operational needs
.
• Quest for technical and managerial excellence at all
levels
.
• Recognition of the necessity for both top-down direction
and bottom-up inputs
.
• Accountability essential at all levels.
• Necessity for strategies as tools to implement policies.
• Recognition that sometimes technical advance must be
injected into the main stream of the system forcibly.
• Recognition of essential need for adequate information
systems to allow interaction.
With a strong push in Navy policy to promote accountability,
a more decentralized organization is developing, as evidenced
by the formation of the Block Program Offices. This allows
a means for providing technical management in the laboratories
and Systems Commands with the necessary authority to plan and
manage technical efforts related to the pursuit of significant
objectives
.
As a result of direction by the ASN (R&D) to establish and
implement a program to improve the exploratory development sys-
tem, to improve higher echelons 1 understanding of the system
and to justify 6.2 expenditures, the Exploratory Development
Program has been, and currently is being radically revamped.
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Central to these modifications is the use of dynamic "technical
strategies," designed to focus exploratory development more
directly and visibly on operational needs. The primary objec-
tives of the new management system are to:
• Provide top-down direction by the use of technical
strategies, prioritized technical objectives and
definition of major program thrusts designed to meet
operational requirements
.
• Provide visibility by relating the program to Navy
functions and operational needs.
• Promote innovation and concentration on highest leverage
opportunities
.
• Expedite transfer of projects to advanced development
(6.3) and use of new technical capabilities developed
in research (6.1).
• Demonstrate program relevance and cost-effectiveness.
It is essential that a firm understanding of the technical
strategies, functional areas and program elements be had to
augment an understanding of the EDP objectives and transition
steps . Only through a thorough knowledge of the inner work-
ings of the new system can any meaningful review, evaluation
and assessment methodology be realized. While no established
program exists currently, there certainly is potential for
developing a viable methodology, particularly with the well
structured and goal oriented EDP being implemented today.
Worth-assessment processes to date have not been able to
be adequately applied to the R&D structure in general, nor the
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EDP in particular. This is due primarily to the traditional
programs being system requirement rather than mission need
(goal) oriented. Further, earlier models did not define in-
puts in terms that were worth-dependent because different
worth criteria and underlying assessment processes must be
specifically tailored to particular activities.
The future of R&D planning models is not particularly
promising in light of observed methodological problems and
managerial resistance to their use. The models just have not
been able to capture all of the relevant and subtle aspects
of the R&D and the EDP planning process.
But organizations performing exploratory development must
still select and evaluate programs some way. These decisions
can be improved through a better understanding of both the
process of innovation and the exploratory development planning
process
.
New techniques and methodologies, as well as revisions of
old ones, are constantly being identified, many receiving par-
ticular area utilization, which will contribute to the process
of rational decision making; i.e., program evaluation and
assessment. One method felt to have high potential in the
exploratory development area is that called Evaluation Research,
Originally developed for application to social action programs,
it is best utilized in situations where sound platforms of
goals and objectives can be established. Thus, there appears
to be a potentially viable technique which might be applied to




The stage has been set for the design of a new methodo-
logical tool to assess the worth of programs in the EDP
.
A technique has been identified which has high potential. It
is strongly recommended that further study be undertaken,
using the background and management planning systems presented
in this thesis, to ultimately demonstrate the ability of eval-
uation research to effectively determine a measure of worth
of programs in the Exploratory Development Program.
The evidence suggests that such a tool can be realized.
What is required now is to uncover a progressively oriented
faction of the EDP willing to commit the necessary resources





EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES
The following delineates Exploratory Development Program
management responsibilities. It discusses basic organization
design principles, the responsiblities of Program organiza-
tions and officials, and the various roles played by non-
NAVMAT organizations and officials in the 6.2 Program.
Organization Design Concepts . The Exploratory Development
Program management system is designed to strike the best com-
promise between the need to administer public resources in
accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies,
and the need to provide technical management with the freedom
required to hold them accountable for results. The responsi-
bilities described for the Exploratory Development Program are
based on the following design principles:
Fixed accountability . Establishing the conditions neces-
ary to hold individual officials (as distinguished from diffuse
bureaucracies) accountable is a central consideration. Pre-
requisites to accountability include:
a. Assigning responsibility for results to an individual.
b. Provide that individual with the necessary authority
and resources to accomplish the required results. If a mana-
ger is to be held accountable, he must have the opportunity




c. Providing the responsible individual with the oppor-
tunity to perform by limiting the demands on his time. This
includes demands by superiors and their staffs, and by other
external officials and organizations.
Clear separation of responsibilities . Responsibilities
for determing the objectives to be pursued, and the technical
effort required to fulfill those objectives, have been clearly
and deliberately separated. Although it is essential that
spokesmen for these two interests conduct an in-depth dia-
logue in the process of defining the Program, it is important
to avoid conflict of interest. In the management system
described herein, technical people are not in a position to
dictate "requirements," and management people and sponsors
are not in a position to control the selection of technical
approach.
Quality information for management . The management sys-
tem has been designed to provide the ASN (R&D) , CND, and
lower-level officials with all the information they require
to implement their Program responsibilities. The interaction
of organizations generates quantitative information required
for technical management to put technical resources to their
most productive use, and for higher-level management to
reallocate resources as required to increase overall Program
output. A system of institutionalized Program Reviews ensures
the quality of information provided to top management.
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Management by objectives and results . The management
system relies on mutually established and agreed-upon objec-
tives and goals rather than on management by specific direc-
tives, detailed procedures, elaborate reporting systems,
frequent reviews, and other close controls. Management is
by "self-control" in pursuit of the most efficient accomplish-
ments of stated objectives. Higher-level review primarily
measures results achieved in relation to approved objectives.
"People information system" for coupling . The process of
defining EDP projects which collectively support Department
of the Navy purposes requires extensive and intimate inter-
action between competent spokesmen for both sponsor and per-
former organizations. The interaction of Technical Strategists
with spokesmen for Mission Needs and with technical managers
in the laboratories is a vital element of the "people infor-
mation system." This face-to-face, paper-free information
system provides a mechanism for the flow of information on
needs and operational environment to the technical community,
and for the reverse flow of knowledge about technical oppor-
tunity to the CNO/CMC staffs.
Program Management Responsibilities
Deputy Chief of Naval Material (Development) (DNM(D)/
Chief of Naval Development (CND) ) . As DCNM(D), this officer
reports directly to CNM. As CND, he is directly responsible
to ASN (R&D). DCNM(D)/CND has overall control of the Explor-
atory Development Program and its funds. He carries out this
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general responsibility primarily through the DNT. His func-
tions include:
a. Reviewing and approving the Exploratory Development
Program Plan (EDPP) at each stage in its evolution (i.e., the
Draft and Tentative EDPPs , as well as the EDPP.
b. Appointing Technical Strategists.
c. Approving Technical Strategies.
d. Approving Program Plans and related budgets.
e. Directing the allocation of funds.
Director of Technology Programs /Director of Navy Technol -
ogy DTP/DNT . As DNT, this official is directly responsible
to the ASN (R&D). As DTP, he is responsible to the DCNM(D)/
CND. Acting for the CND, he is responsible for the planning,
execution, and evaluation of the Exploratory Development Pro-
gram. His functions include the following:
a. Designing a balanced and integrated overall Explora-
tory Development Program which maximizes the contribution of
the Technology Base to the mission capability of Department
of the Navy operating forces
.
b. Developing and documenting the Exploratory Development
Program Plan (EDPP) for review and approval by CND and ASN (R&D)
c. Nominating Technical Strategists and appointing
Strategy Team members.
d. Reviewing and coordinating Technical Strategies.
e. Developing a Program-wide priority list for concept-
related technical effort.

f. Negotiating Program Plans (and related budgets) with
Systems Command Directors of Research and Technology (SYSCOM
03s) and with Technical Directors of the laboratories (Lab
TDs) , and recommending those plans to CND for approval.
g. Appointing Program Review Team leaders, and assisting
in the staffing of Review Teams.
h. Scheduling and chartering External Program Review,
i. Conducting Program Reviews at the SYSCOM 03/Lab TD
level.
SYSCOM Directors of Research and Technology (SYSCOM 03s )
.
The SYSCOM 3s plan and execute that portion of the overall
Exploratory Development Program related to System Concepts
(SCs) and other products within the material responsibility
areas of their SYSCOM. The general responsibilities of a
SYSCOM 3 include:
a. Designing a balanced and integrated overall SYSCOM
Exploratory Development Program which supports Objectives in
the approved Mission Area Technical Strategies.
b. Documenting planned technical efforts in a Program
Plan for negotiation with and approval by the DNT
.
c. Prioritizing concept-related objectives set forth in
the Program Plan.
d. Providing designated personnel to serve as Technical
Strategists and as members of Strategy and Program Review
Teams, as requested by DNT.




f. Reviewing proposed changes in TAPs approving desired
changes within his authority, and submitting desired changes
beyond his authority to DNT for appropriate action.
g. Monitoring execution of his SYSCOM's technical program,
and taking actions as appropriate.
h. Ensuring the Internal Review of his SYSCOM's program,
and providing copies of Internal Review Reports to DNT.
Laboratory Technical Directors (Lab TDs ) . The Lab TDs plan
and execute that portion of the overall Exploratory Develop-
ment Program related to the development and utilization of
technology within the areas of Laboratory responsibilities.
The general responsibilities of the Lab TD include the follow-
ing functions:
a. Designing a balanced and integrated overall Laboratory
Exploratory Development Program which supports approved Tech-
nology Area Strategies.
b. Documenting planned technical efforts in a Program
Plan for negotiation with and approval by the DNT.
c. Prioritizing technology-related objectives set forth
in the Program Plan.
d. Providing designated personnel to serve as Technical
Strategists and as members of Strategy and Program Review
Teams, as requested by DNT.
e. Negotiating and approving proposed TAPs.
f. Monitoring execution of his Laboratory's Technical
Program, and taking actions as appropriate.
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g. Reviewing changes in proposed TAPs approving desired
changes within his authority, and submitting desired changes
beyond his authority to the DNT or SYSCOM 03 as appropriate.
h. Ensuring the Internal Review of his Laboratory's pro-
gram, and providing copies of Internal Review Reports to DNT.
Responsibilities for preparation of Technical Strategies .
Each Technical Strategy is developed and/or updated by a Tech-
nical Strategist and a supporting Technical Strategy Team.
Technical Strategists . A Technical Strategist is respon-
sible for the development and updating of each Technical
Strategy. Strategists report to DNT for all matters relating
to their Technical Strategies. Technical Strategists may be
recruited from any Department of the Navy organization;
normally, however, they will be NAVMAT , Laboratory, or Systems
Command officials "double hatted" to CND for this duty. The
general responsibilities of Technical Strategists include:
a. Identifying Strategy Team needs with the appropriate
knowledge and organizational affiliations.
b. Developing and/or updating the assigned Technical
Strategy as required (with the aid of the Strategy Team)
.
c. Maintaining current knowledge of the Technical Strategy
in general (and its MA or TA Objectives in particular) and of
all relevant technical capabilities, current efforts, and
planned efforts.
d. Reviewing all TAPs which purport to support Objectives
listed in the Strategy, and taking appropriate actions to im-




e. Serving as person-to-person channels between CND/DNT
,
Strategy Teams, and the technical community for the flow of
needs information related to their Technical Strategies.
This function includes helping technical personnel establish
direct contact with individuals most knowledgeable about issues
of interest.
Strategy Team . Strategy Teams are constituted so that
they have within the Team the essential knowledge and expertise
required for the development of the Technical Strategy—without
reference to documents except for detailed information. Such
representation, in addition to helping in the cost-effective
preparation of an adequate Strategy document, is an essential
element in the development and maintenance of the "people
information system." Ideally, the Strategy Team includes
members from organizations which both require information on
the Strategy, and which are sources of information required in
the development of the Strategy. Each Strategy Team should
include individuals who served on the Team in prior years;
this ensures the preservation of a paper-free institutional
memory. MA Strategy Teams include members from all TA Strategy
Teams for technologies critical to the attainment of the MA
Objectives. Participation of these people provides a direct
and paper-free injection of information on technological capa-
bilities and potential capabilities into the development and
updating of the Strategy, and a reverse flow of Mission Need
information into the program planning and execution activities
of their parent Systems Commands and Laboratories. TA Strategy
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Teams include spokesmen for SCs which use subject technology,
members from organizations developing subject technology, and
representatives of the research community involved in develop-
ing the base of knowledge underlying the subject technology.
Source of Strategy Team members . Strategy Team members
are recruited from both Government and the private sector.
Department of the Navy technical organizations are directed
to provide members to Technical Strategists on a negotiated
basis. Assistance in recruiting non-Department of the Navy
personnel will be provided by DNT (Attention MAT 03T3)
.
Strategy Team members from Department of the Navy organiza-
tions are to be provided travel and analytical support by
their parent organizations as required.
Program Review Teams . There are two kinds of Program
Review: Internal Review and External Review (see Chap. IV)
.
Internal Review Teams, under the leadership of the cognizant
Laboratory Technical Director or SYSCOM 03, conduct self-
reviews of all detailed technical programs. External Review
Teams, under the leadership of a designated member of DNT '
s
staff, conduct External Program Reviews at the Laboratory/
SYSCOM level.
Staffing the Interval Reviews . SYSCOM 3s and Laboratory
Technical Directors are responsible for determining the size
and make-up of each Laboratory or SYSCOM Internal Review
Team, and for assigning individuals from within their respec-
tive organizations to serve as Team members. TD/SYSCOM 03s




Staffing External Reviews . Two primary considerations
determine the staffing of External Review Teams: (1) Team
members should be qualified to verify the validity of Internal
Review information without reference to additional documenta-
tion, and (2) the External Review Process should establish
a "people information system" which contributes to the effec-
tive planning and execution of the overall Program. The DNT-
chartered External Program Review Team is a broad-based ad hoc
group. DNT appoints an External Review Team leader from his
staff; he also appoints other Team members from among inter-
ested and qualified Navy and non-Navy organizations . External
Review Team members include: (1) current and/or former members
of relevant Strategy Teams, (2) DNT staff members, (3) members
of previous DNT Program Review Teams (to ensure the preserva-
tion of a paper-free institutional memory; these individuals
can note what has been done about deficiencies discovered in
previous External Program Reviews)
, (4) representatives of
organizations which supply inputs to the programs under review
(e.g., ONR Scientific Officers for disciplines critical to the
technologies involved)
, (5) representatives of organizations
which use the outputs of the programs under review, (6) tech-
nology managers who conduct similar programs, and (7) experts
from the wider technical community, including industry. Extern-
nal Program Review Team members are important links in the
paper-free "people information system."
DNT Staff . The DNT staff provides the DNT with supporting
services, information, and counsel required for effective
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performance of DNT's Exploratory Development Program manage-
ment functions. Individual staff members are assigned cogni-
zance over specific matters—such as individual Technical
Strategies, Laboratories and SYSCOMs and their related Pro-
gram Plans, and Program Elements. Specific duties of these
cognizant staff members are discussed below.
Technical Strategies . Duties of the DNT staff members
assigned cognizance over a Technical Strategy include:
a. Achieving and maintaining in-depth knowledge of the
Technical Strategy, its rationale, and of all on-going or
planned technical effort supporting Objectives in the approved
Strategy.
b. Serving as a member of the Strategy Team for that
Strategy.
c. Providing staff services for the recruitment and
assignment of Strategy Team members, in compliance with staffing
requirements developed by the Technical Strategist.
d. Alerting the DNT to developments or trends related to
the Strategy which require DNT's attention.
Organization and Program Plans . Duties of DNT staff mem-
bers assigned cognizance over technical organizations and
related Program Plans include:
a. Achieving and maintaining in-depth knowledge of the
planning and execution aspects of the organization's technical




b. Reviewing proposed Program Plans and providing DNT
with appropriate information and counsel.
c. Serving on the Program Review Team (as leader or
member)
.
d. Determining requirements for Review Team personnel,
and taking necessary actions to facilitate the recruitment
and assignment of appropriate personnel.
e. Alerting the DNT to developments or trends related
to the organization (or its Technical program) which require
DNT s attention.
f. Providing oral and written information about the
organization and its program to Government officials and pri-
vate sector individuals with a need to know.
Program Elements . Duties of DNT staff members assigned
cognizance over a Program Element include:
a. Achieving and maintaining in-depth knowledge of:
(1) planning and execution aspects of work included within the
Program Element, (.2) technical objectives and supporting
rationales for the work performed, and C3) all actions and
policies of higher level officials, including the Congress,
related to the Program Element.
b. Preparing Program Element Descriptions (PEDs) and any-
other documentation required in connection with the annual




c. Preparing PE-level TAP Aggregates using TAP informa-
tion approved by SYSCOM 3s and Lab TDs (and by DC/S RD&S and
CG MCDEC for Marine Corps programs)
.
d. Alerting DNT to developments or trends related to the
Program Element which require DNT ' s attention.
e. Providing information, both orally and in writing,
concerning the Program Element to Government officials and
private sector individuals with a need to know.
Interfacing Responsibilities . Other organizations and
individuals outside of the Naval Material Command play signifi-
cant roles in the Exploratory Development Program.
Congress . The Congress provides the funds for the 6.2
Program and establishes funding controls at the Program Ele-
ment level. Congress may, on occasion, control the funding of
individual projects. Management responsiveness to Congress,
credibility of information, and utility of results are essen-
tial to continued stability of the Navy's Program.
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E ) . The
DDR&E exerts influence at all levels of the Program. He can
compare the management and technical content of the Exploratory
Development Programs of all Services, and can direct all tech-
nical programs in an area to be assigned to one Service. The
DDR&E is the dominant DoD agency in the justification of work
and the budgeting of funds.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development
CASNCR&D ) ) . The ASN (R&D) is responsible for the RDT&E (N)
appropriation, and for the planning and execution of the entire

Department of the Navy RDT&E Program (including Exploratory-
Development) . ASN (R&D) reviews and approves the various
versions of the EDPP on an exception basis. He is also charged
with justification of the Navy EDP to DDR&E and Congress. The
small ASN (R&D) staff relies heavily on the CND and his staff
for information and presentation of the program. Close work-
ing relationships and mutual confidence between CND/DNT and
the ASN (R&D) are essential.
Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps
( CNO/CMC ) . The CNO and CMC influence the 6.2 Program by estab-
lishing operational needs and by directly sponsoring Advanced
and Engineering Development. As the primary markets for the
Program output, the CNO/CMC must be satisfied with its mili-
tary relevance. The CND, assisted by the SYSCOMs , interprets
the operational needs described by CNO/CMC in the Technical
Strategy documents. The subsequent discussion, understanding,
refinement, and definition of operational needs lead to devel-
opment and acceptance of a useful product. CNO/CMC review
all SCs when they are first submitted, and annually as long
as they are included in the Program. CNO/CMC estimate the
military worths of all SCs and assign them quantitative mili-
tary worth ratings, "v" ratings, for use in planning Technical
Strategies and supporting technical programs.
Chief of Naval Research (CNR ) . In addition to his respon-
sibilities for the Naval Research Program, the CNR is responsi-
ble for sponsoring these exploratory development projects

which are necessary to ensure orderly transition from research
to development. For the projects which he sponsors, CNR func-
tions like a Systems Command.
Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) and Chief , Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery (CHBUMED ) . CNP/CHBUMED are the primary
sponsors for Exploratory Development relative to the human
subsystem and to medical and dental systems. They are under-
stood throughout this instruction to function like a Systems
Command in these areas.
Industry/Academia . Industry and educational institutions
interact principally at the SYSCOM and Laboratory levels.
They provide Laboratories and SYSCOMs with assistance, on a




EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION
The documentation for planning and justifying the Explora-
tory Development Program is described in this appendix. The
basic document through which the Chief of Naval Development
(CND) and the Director of Navy Technology (DNT) control the
Program is the Exploratory Development Program Plan (EDPP)
.
The EDPP is supported by Technical Strategy documents, Labor-
atory and System Command Program Plans, and Systems Concepts
(SCs)
.
Exploratory Development Program Plan (EDPP ) . The EDPP
is the authoritative statement of the content and rationale
of the Navy's Exploratory Development Program. It defines
the major thrusts of the overall Program, identifies major
Program goals, and apportions resources among all elements
of the Program. Further, it summarizes and provides an inte-
grated overview of the Technical Strategies and the supporting
Laboratory and Systems Command Program Plans. The EDPP is
prepared by the Director of Navy Technology (DNT) on the basis
of: (1) budget and program guidance from higher authority,
(2) Technical Objectives developed by the Strategy Team,
(3) Program Plans developed by Laboratories and SYSCOMs, and
(4) Internal and External Program Review Reports. The EDPP
is continually updated to reflect changes in these inputs.
Technical Strategies . Technical Strategies serve two
major purposes: They effectively relate the Exploratory
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Development Program to Department of the Navy Mission Needs,
and they make that relationship visible and credible.
Functions of Technical Strategies , Technical Strategies
have both direct and indirect functions.
Direct Functions . Technical Strategies are designed to:
(1) take maximum advantage of new technical opportunities,
(2) exploit deficiencies in opposition capabilities, and
(3) provide prompt response to perceived requirements for
superior naval capability.
Indirect Functions . Strategies provide the vehicle for a
two-way information flow on needs and technological capabili-
ties (and possibilities) . They also serve as the means for
demonstrating the general rationality— and specifically the
mission-relevance in output-oriented terms—of the Exploratory
Development Program.
Kinds of Technical Strategies . There are two kinds of
Technical Strategies: those which relate to the Mission
Areas for which the Navy has responsibility and those which
relate to the Technology Areas which are basic to the Navy's
operational capabilities.
Mission Area (MA) Technical Strategies . MA Technical
Strategies directly link the Exploratory Development Program
to the major missions of Department of the Navy operating
forces. MA Strategies are developed for assigned Mission
Areas or for established segments of Mission Areas. Since
MA Strategies are designed both to relate the Program to
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operational missions, and to facilitate understanding of that
relationship by officials and organizations with influence
over the Department of the Navy Program, MA Strategy Areas
are structured to be compatible with the structure of Mission
Areas used by DDR&E in the Mission Area Summaries (MAS)
.
Technology Area (TA) Technical Strategies . TA Technical
Strategies set forth objectives for technology and the sup-
porting rationales. The structure of areas for which TA
Strategies are developed is also derived from the DDR&E mission
Area Summaries. TA Technical Strategies so defined are also
compatible with the Technology Coordinating Papers (TCPs)
issued by the OSD.
Preparation of Technical Strategies . Preparation of both
MA and TA Technical Strategies involves the identification
and evaluation of needs, and the identification of present,
future, and potential capabilities for satisfying those needs.
All Technical Strategy documents employ a similar format.
Each describes the relevant Strategy Area (this will be either
a Mission Area or a Technology Area) , sets forth Objectives
and the supporting rationales, identifies how Objectives in
the Strategy Area are being pursued currently, and references
sources of additional information.
Mission Area (MA) Technical Strategies . In general, each
MA Technical Strategy sets forth: CD Mission Area Objectives
for the Mission Area, (2) the supporting rationales for those
Objectives, and (3) a discussion of present and future
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exploratory development efforts relevant to MA Objectives.
Preparing MA Technical Strategies requires a comprehensive
understanding of operational needs.
Mission Need Information . Mission Need information is
available through both formal and informal systems. Informa-
tion on operational needs is provided primarily through an
informal face-to-face system based on and backed up by a
document-based system. Information on needs is derived from
a variety of sources including Fleet letters, CNO memoranda,
extrapolation of threat statements, etc. Mission Need infor-
mation flows through the Navy/Marine Corps organization to
the Exploratory Development Program by means of three formal
documents: the Navy Science and Technology Objectives (STOs)
,
the Marine Corps General Operational Requirements (GORs) , and
the Operational Requirements (ORs) . The first two documents
are aimed primarily at guiding the inception of projects and
programs (although guidance may be derived from them at any
point in the process) . The Operational Requirements (ORs) are
concerned with the transition of System Concepts to Advanced
Development.
Mission Area Objectives . MA Objectives are objectives
for operational capabilities within the Strategy Areas. They
are set forth as means-free statements of needs for opera-
tional capabilities required to execute the mission. These
statements are prepared in a manner which satisfies the
requirements for statements of Mission Needs for the initiation
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of major system acquisitions as set forth in OMB Circular
A-109 and implementing DOD directives and instructions. MA
Objectives should be considered identical to the Mission
Element Need Statements (MENS) defined in DOD Directive
5000.1 and should conform to the format specified in Appendix
D. All MA Objectives are to be numbered in a manner which
facilitates the information capabilities discussed in 4.6.
The rationale for each MA Objective should be explained
clearly and concisely and should reference all official docu-
mentation (such as STOs and GORs) on which it is based in
whole or in part.
Actual and Potential Capabilities . Associated with each
MA Objective is a discussion of means for satisfying the
Objective. This discussion consists of a concise description
of each system, System Concept, or other way (such as a combi-
nation of forces) to satisfy the Objective, along with refer-
ences to primary sources of additional information. Addition-
ally, capabilities relevant to each Mission Need are to be
identified and summarized briefly. These include present capa-
bilities, systems in development or production but not yet
operational, and Demonstrated-feasible, Presumed- feasible
,
and Pre-feasible System Concepts (SCs) . All SCs will include
military worth ratings by CNO and/or CMC. The listing of
Demonstrated-feasible SCs will also identify concepts which
were dropped since the last update of the Technical Strategy.
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Technology Area (TA) Technical Strategies . Each TA
Technical Strategy: (1) Describes current technical efforts
and relates these to identified Mission Needs, (2) sets forth
Objectives for technology and the supporting rationales of
those Objectives, (3) justifies the importance of technical
opportunities and potential advancements in output-oriented
terms, and (4) explicitly summarizes and presents justifica-
tions for present, future and potential technological capabil-
ities by specifically referencing relevant SCs. TA Technical
Strategies are developed and/or updated in a manner analogous
to the process described above for MA Technical Strategies.
The process involves defining Technology Needs, setting forth
the rationales for those needs, and describing present, future,
and potential capabilities relevant to identified Objectives.
A Technology Area is concisely defined in terms of the tech-
nologies included within its scope. Where further clarity
is needed, a Technology Area may be further defined by identi-
fying related technologies beyond its scope.
Technology Need Information . Technology Need information
is derived from three principal sources: (1) the systematic
analysis of Pre-feasible SCs, (2) feedback from the develop-
ment and manufacturing processes, and (3) feedback from the
operating forces. Information from analysis of SCs takes the
form of documented statements of technological problems or
barriers; feedback information flows primarily through person-
to-person links and is introduced into the Strategy delibera-




Technology Area Objectives . Objectives for technological
capabilities are set forth as statements of needs for tech-
nological capabilities, termed Technology Area Objectives,
or TA Objectives. These are statements of needs both for the
development of new technological capabilities in support of
SCs , and for the preservation of a base of technology under-
lying present operational capabilities (where it is judged
that such a technology base would be endangered in the absence
of action to preserve it) . TA Objectives are numerically
identified in a manner which facilitates the information capa-
bilities discussed above and in 4.6. The rationale for each
TA Objective should be set forth clearly and concisely and
should reference all official documentation (such as techno-
logical problem statements from analyses of SCs) on which it
is based. Every rationale should present a convincing case
which describes how the Objective is critical either to
achievement of higher level of mission capability or to the
preservation of capabilities which would be endangered in the
absence of actions the Objective is designed to stimulate.
Actual and Potential Capabilities . Technological capa-
bilities relevant to each TA Objective are identified and
summarized briefly, as are the rationales for each of those
capabilities. These include statements and rationales for
current capabilities, for capabilities anticipated on the
basis of planned technical effort, and for capabilities which
are potentially achievable if a specified level of technical
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effort is assumed. The accompanying discussion identifies
the leading organizations possessing, acquiring, or capable
of acquiring the capabilities. Relevant ongoing or planned
technical programs are identified, and their predicted impacts
on capabilities are specified.
Program Plans . Program Plans are the primary instruments
through which the DNT exerts top-down influence over portions
of the Exploratory Development Program assigned to each SYS-
COM and Laboratory. Program Plans document each SYSCOM's
or Laboratory's integrated and balanced plan for maximizing
the contribution of its own exploratory development efforts
to Department of the Navy needs . Program Plans are not
collections of Task Area Plans (TAPs) . (TAPs are prepared
after the Program Plans are approved and are designed to
carry out objectives listed in those Plans.) Analogous to a
DCP for approval, funding, and management of an acquisition
program, the Program Plan constitutes a "contract" between
DNT and the SYSCOM 3/Lab TD for the Laboratory/SYS COM por-
tions of the 6.2 Program. The Program Plan is the basis for
the negotiation, approval, funding, and subsequent review
of each SYSCOM's and Laboratory's Exploratory Development
Program. The content and format for Program Plans are sum-
marized briefly below.
Technology Needs and Thrusts . This section will provide
an introduction and overview of the proposed technical pro-
gram, setting forth the major thrusts of the program and the
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rationale for those thrusts. It will also discuss significant
changes from past years and the rationale for those changes.
Program Objectives . The technological objectives the
technical program is designed to achieve will be set forth,
as will the rationale for those objectives. These objectives
are to be stated in quantitative terms (to the extent possible)
to facilitate subsequent review of results. The rationale
for objectives should explicitly identify the approved
Technical Objectives which the program objectives are designed
to support.
Proposed Program . The technical program to achieve each
program objective will be briefly described in both narrative
and quantitative terms. This description should include the
proposed dollars to be spent in support of each program objec-
tive, the prospective performing institution (s) , and major
milestones scheduled for achievement during the program year.
In-House/Contract Ratio . The program plan will specify
the relative proportions of work to be performed by Govern-
ment organizations (in-house) and by industry and other non-
Government organizations (under contract) . The DNT will
negotiate the in-house/contract ratios with each SYSCOM and
Laboratory to ensure that the overall Program conforms to the
most recent policy guidance.
Program Turnover . Ongoing efforts should be critically
reviewed and sufficient work completed or terminated, to
permit a minimum of 20% of the technical program to be composed
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of new starts. The Program Plan will specify the percentage
of the program which is new, and will identify efforts being
completed or terminated.
Priorities . The technical program will be organized into
decision packages corresponding to discrete elements of the
proposed program (such as all work related to specific System
Concept or Laboratory subproject) . These decision packages
will be presented, along with cost information, in a rank
ordering. This is intended to facilitate the elimination, or
addition, of entire projects (rather than to make across-the-
board funding reductions which could result in subcritical
funding and the inefficient use of resources) . Rank ordering
also facilitates the phased initiation of new starts to accom-
modate Congressional budget actions and deferrals of funds.
System Concepts . Priority rankings for SYSCOMs will be
organized around the SCs which are the objectives of SYSCOM
efforts. Information to be presented will include:
a. A master rank-order of all ongoing and new starts of
all three classes of SCs.
b. A rank-order of both ongoing and new starts for each
of the three classes of SCs.
c. A rank-order for proposed new starts for each category
of SC.
Laboratory Subprojects . The proposed Laboratory program
will be presented as a master rank-ordered list of subprojects
and will include ongoing work and proposed new starts.
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System Concepts (SCs ) . An SC is a System Concept for
satisfying one or more MA Objectives. SCs provide a mechanism
for: (1) identifying technology needs, (2) focusing technical
effort on the technological advances required to make these
high-leverage system concepts feasible, and (3) aiding trans-
fer of that technology to development once technical feasi-
bility has been achieved. Although normally originated by
Laboratories, Systems Commands, or industry, SCs may be origi-
nated by any organization. Instructions for the documentation
of SCs are contained in Appendix E.
Classes of System Concepts . SCs fall into three classes: (1)
concepts presumed not yet technologically feasible without
advances in underlying technology, (2) concepts presumed to
be technologically feasible within five years but for which
feasibility has yet to be demonstrated, and (3) concepts
presumed ready for transition to development. Each of these
three classes of SCs serves a different function in the man-
agement of the Exploratory Development Program. All classes
of SCs provide a basis for the assessment of a concept's
military worth; this is an essential prerequisite to the fur-
ther investment of technological resources (beyond the invest-
ment required to define concepts sufficiently to permit
meaningful military worth assessments)
.
Pre-Feasible System Concepts . Pre-feasible SCs provide a
basis for identifying and defining technology which must be
developed before these concepts become technologically feasible
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When communicated to the technical community involved in devel-
oping broad-based technology, these technological require-
ments stimulate development of the requisite technology.
Pre-feasible SCs (and their related requirements for advance-
ments in technology) are an essential link in the relevance
audit trail; they make it possible to demonstrate the direct
relevance of technical effort in the broad-based technology
category to operational missions.
Presumed-Feasible System Concepts . SCs for which feasi-
bility has been presumed but not yet demonstrated provide
the framework for: (1) defining the requirements for feasi-
bility demonstrations/ and (2) organizing related data.
Demonstrating the feasibility of an SC can be likened to
assembling a technological building block kit. As feasibil-
ity is demonstrated for each essential technology, it is
added to the kit until all essential building blocks are in
hand. At that point the concept becomes a "Demonstrated-
feasible SC" and is ready for transfer to further development.
Demons trated-Feasible System Concepts . Demonstrated-
feasible SCs which are not immediately transferred to devel-
opment may be dropped, or, they may be preserved as options
for future development (depending upon the military worth
assessment of the system user) . Where a decision has been
made to preserve the option to develop, the SC provides the
framework for the preservation of that option. The develop-
ment option is preserved by continually: (1) monitoring
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relevant technologies, (2) updating the information package
to include current capabilities, and (3) identifying organi-
zations which possess the needed capabilities.
Assessment of the Military Worth of SCs . The CNO and CMC
are invited to assess periodically the relative military
worths of all SCs related to each MA objective in their areas
of warfare. These military worth ratings, termed "V" ratings
for value, are to be included in the discussion on MS Objec-
tives in the Technical Strategy documents.
Task Area Plans . Detailed plans for accomplishing the
objectives in approved Program Plans are summarized in Task
Area Plans (TAP) . Since program plan objectives are designed
to support objectives in approved Technical Strategies, the
Strategies provide amplifying guidance for the development
of these more detailed plans
.
Information System . Because of the direct relationship
between Technical Objectives called out in the Technical
Strategies and objectives defined in the Laboratory and SYS-
COM Program Plans, a relevance audit trail extends from each
work unit to each assigned Department of the Navy mission.
When the information system mandated by paragraph 4.b. of
ASN (R&D) memo of 25 July 19 75, "Management of the Exploratory
Development Program," is developed and in successful operation,
it will be possible to make these relevance relationships
visible through automatic data processing. An ADP query
starting with a Mission Need will be able to identify all MA
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Objectives called out in the MA Technical Strategy for that
area, all Technology Area Objectives in support of MA Objec-
tives called out in any of the TA Technical Strategies, all
program objectives which support the MA Objectives either
directly or indirectly through TA Objectives, and all work
units supporting these program objectives. Going the other
way, ADP capability based on the structure of objectives
extending upward from the technical program, through the
Technical Strategies to Department of the Navy missions, will
make it possible to trace the impact of each work unit on




STRUCTURE OF THE EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
The Chief of Naval Development (CND) establishes and
promulgates the structural framework for planning, programming,
and budgeting the Navy's Exploratory Development Program. This
structure provides a link with DOD Program Elements, defines
the scope of work within specific areas, and identifies the
organization within the Navy responsible for planning, pro-
gramming, and budgeting.
Building Blocks of the Exploratory Development Program .
The building blocks of the Exploratory Development Program
are described in the following paragraphs. They are listed
in descending order, from the largest block to the smallest.
Program Elements . Program Elements are the smallest sub-
division of the R&D program considered in the DOD programming
system. A program is defined as an integrated activity, an
identifiable military capability; a force, support activity,
research activity, etc., comprising a combination of personnel,
equipment, and facilities. In exploratory development, a
Program Element consists of a number of projects in a related
field within a single budget activity.
Program Groups . Program groups are primary divisions
within the Navy exploratory development planning system. They
are used for management and data-processing purposes, and
provide the links between the Navy planning system and the
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Program Elements of the DOD system. They correspond one-to-
one with the Program Elements—with the exception of Groups
54 and 55, each of which corresponds to two Program Elements
and thus requires the project area number to relate a compo-
nent effort to the correct Program Element. The program















Program Element Title Element #
Undersea Target Surveillance 62711N
Surface/Aerospace Target Surveillance 62712N
Command and Control 6 2721N
Missile Propulsion 62331N
Strike Warfare Weaponry 62332N









Group # Program Element Title Element #
52 Ocean and Atmospheric Support 52759N
Technology
53 Logistics Technology 62760N
54 Materials 62761N
54 Electronic Devices 62762N
55 Training and Human Engineering 62 757N
55 Personnel Support Technology 62763N
56 C/B Weapons Defense 62764N
57 Energy and Environmental Protection 62765N
61 Laboratory IED 62 766N
Functional Area . The functional areas are the five
principal headings under which exploratory development is
classified for program planning purposes. These functional
areas are:
100 - Target Surveillance
200 - Command and Control
30 - Weaponry
400 - Naval Vehicles
500 - Support Technology
Project Areas . Project areas further subdivide the func-
tional areas, as shown in Appendix and serve to group
closely-related task areas.
Projects . Projects encompass the aggregate of task areas
under a given project area which fall within a single program




Subprojects . Subprojects encompass the aggregate of task
areas within a project which are assigned to a single princi-
pal development activity. Development activity identifying









Task Areas . Task areas encompass exploratory development
effort directed toward a specific objective, e.g., thrust-
controlled solid rocket. Task areas are the level at which
detailed plans are prepared. These plans are available to
the Chief of Naval Development as back-up data for justifica-
tion of the Program to higher authorities, if needed. A task
area may consist of one or more tasks and be assigned to an
individual Laboratory, Systems Command, or Office of
implementation
.
Tasks . Tasks are subdivisions of task areas established
on the basis of organizations performing the work. They are
used for internal Department of the Navy management only.
Specific task assignments are made for the portion of the
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work under a given task area to be contracted or to be
assigned to an individual Laboratory or field activity. A
task may consist of one or more work units.
Work Units . Work units are the smallest segments into
which research and technology efforts are normally divided
for purposes of local administration. In the Exploratory
Development Program, work units are subdivisions of a task
selected by the organization performing the work to provide
effective local technical control and supervision. A work
unit is technically distinguishable in scope, objective, and/
or approach from other scientific or technical efforts with
which it may be aggregated for financial or administrative
purposes
.
Numbering System . Based upon the building blocks des-
cribed above, the numbering system applied to specific devel-
opment efforts within the Exploratory Development Program is
designed to permit ready identification and retrieval of infor-
mation regarding any portion of the Program. An example of
the use of the system is shown below:
An Exploratory Development effort F
in the "Missile Propulsion" Program Group .... 31
in the "Weaponry" Functional Area 300
and specific Project Area "Solid Propulsion .... 332
has Project Number F 31 332
The portion performed by NAVAIR W
has Subproject Number WF 31 332
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A part of the effort is directed in the
Task Area "Thrust Controlled Solid Rocket" 302
and has Task Area Number WF 31 332 302
Within the Task Area are Tasks , and within
the Tasks are Work Units designated by
three-character identifiers established
respectively by the SYSCOMs and Labs xxx yyy
So that the entire number identifying a
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